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Latinos and the 2012 Election

THE NEW FACE OF THE AMERICAN VOTER

Edited by GABRIEL R. SANCHEZ

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Proactive, Reactive, and Tactical

Mobilizing the Latino Vote in 2012

THERE WAS A NOTICEABLE SHIFT IN THE PERCEIVED RELEVANCE OF THE LATINO electorate during the course of the 2012 presidential campaign. In February 2012, *Time* magazine predicted that Latino voters would determine the outcome of the presidential race (Scherer 2012). Within a few months the optimism faded, and there were more skeptics than believers in the growing presence and influence of the Latino electorate. For example, the Pew Hispanic Center anticipated strong Latino support for Barack Obama over Mitt Romney, but cautioned that Latino voters were less certain about voting than other segments of the electorate (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012). Others feared that President Obama's failure to deliver on a promise of comprehensive immigration reform during his first term and Mitt Romney's opposition to any pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants would leave Latino voters with little incentive to participate in the election (Pino 2012).

In essence, prior to November 6, there was more uncertainty about the overall Latino voter turnout than interest in specific Latino voter preferences. The day after the election, exit polls concluded that Latinos overwhelmingly supported the reelection of President Barack Obama; however, many election analysts and

pundits were caught by surprise by the "unexpectedly" strong Latino voter turnout (Rodriguez 2012). Although there were mixed forecasts from journalists, pundits, and think tanks alike of the impact Latinos would make on Election Day, the high Latino turnout challenged many predictions. Similar to 2008, pundits reflexively credited the partisan campaigns (the president's in particular) for increased electoral participation among young voters, African Americans, and Latinos. However, we argue that attributing higher than expected turnout exclusively to partisan, campaign-driven, get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts overlooks the combined impact of multiple forms of mobilization within the Latino electorate.

In this chapter, we offer a more nuanced understanding of the role of mobilization in the 2012 general election and seek to provide a framework that delineates why mobilization matters in presidential elections generally, and more specifically in 2012. In the first section, we present three primary forms of voter mobilization (tactical, reactive, and proactive) and describe how these three differing forms of mobilization are interrelated and how they are distinct. The second section focuses on deconstructing the misconception that tactical mobilization of Latino voters by partisan campaigns accounts for variation in turnout rates. The third section explores the role that context plays in the decision of Latinos to vote (reactive mobilization) that is not directly attributable to tactical mobilization. The fourth section demonstrates the efforts and programming by nonpartisan civic institutions to build the electorate in 2012 (proactive mobilization) and their long-term goals of increasing Latino civic participation in the United States. The final section concludes with a consideration of the role of Latino mobilization and the particular significance of proactive mobilization strategies in 2014 and beyond. Overall, this chapter redefines the nature of Latino mobilization by presenting an additional layer that accounts for political context, while challenging voter-turnout assumptions.

Latinos, Mobilization, and American Politics

With the growing attention on Latinos across the United States, it is necessary to explore their impact on the local, state, and national political landscape. Scholars and observers have noted that Latinos played a significant role in key elections across the country in 2012, including the reelection of President Barack Obama (Lopez and Taylor 2012; Foley 2012). According to the U.S. Census Bureau, an estimated 11.2 million Latino voters participated in the 2012 general election (U.S. Census Bureau 2013b). This record turnout was not driven solely by candidate appeal or demographic growth, but by a confluence of historically grounded and multifaceted factors that have stimulated Latino voter participation. As evident in figure 1, the growth is

Figure 1. Latino Citizen Voting-Age Population, Voter Registration, and Turnout, 1988–2012



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the November Elections: 1988-2012.

particularly remarkable when considering that fewer than 5 million Latinos voted in 1988 (U.S. Census 2013b).

According to the political participation literature, voter turnout is not only driven by demographic characteristics, such as education, income, and age, but also by recruitment into politics (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). As such, mobilization is key to understanding why and how Latinos continue to surprise pundits and dispel participation myths. Parsimony may work with respect to identifying general patterns of participation in the overall population, but these patterns require more attention when considering Latinos, precisely because they have been largely neglected by political parties and because of the speed at which the Latino electorate is growing (Wong 2008; Ramírez 2013). Leighley (2001) distinguishes between institutional mobilization and particularized mobilization. The former reflects the extent to which the workplace, church, and voluntary associations are politicized, whereas the latter "reflects the strategic efforts of political institutions such as parties, political candidates, and groups to expand conflict in their favor by mobilizing their

supporters" (103–4). While it is important to distinguish between these two forms of mobilization, the analysis does not differentiate between the strategic decisions of partisan versus nonpartisan political elites. We offer a different conceptualization of the recruitment into politics—or mobilization—that identifies three differing forms: tactical, reactive, and proactive.

While it is indeed important that the Latino electorate is now part of the broad strategic decisions of partisan and nonpartisan groups, the consequences for individual Latino voters can be quite distinct. To the extent that presidential campaigns have conscientiously retained Latino outreach directors, these voters may be incorporated into the overall strategic calculus, but this does not speak to the tactics that will be used to mobilize their supporters. The outreach could consist of campaign platforms being translated into Spanish, ensuring that there are key campaign rallies in Latino communities, advertising on Spanish-language media, targeting Latino voters through GOTV campaigns, slating Latina/o candidates, or a combination of these tactics. Tactical mobilization is defined as those voter-engagement efforts that are almost exclusively short-term and focused on a specific outcome in the election (namely, partisan and candidate campaigns) as opposed to those with long-term impact goals, such as Latino electoral presence and growth. In this chapter we explore the role tactical mobilization has played historically in engaging the Latino electorate, and we look to the partisan campaigns of 2012 to better understand their strategic objectives in registering and turning out Latino voters.

Reactive mobilization, defined as political activity in response to a perceived or actual political threat (e.g., legislation or political rhetoric), can have significant impact on the political landscape, and also sets the context for Latino civic participation (Ramírez 2013). This form of mobilization is well-documented, with reactionary politics historically being a major motivating factor for Latino political engagement (Pantoja et al. 2001; Barreto et al. 2005; Barreto et al. 2009). Based on the extant literature, Ramírez (2013) traces the relevance of threat for political activation into protest politics, the decision to naturalize, and electoral politics. While reactive mobilization may last or have consequences beyond one election cycle, it nonetheless begins to dissipate in the absence of imminent political threat. Reactive mobilization can (and often does) take place concurrently with tactical and proactive mobilization.

Finally, proactive mobilization is the coordinated effort of nonpartisan civic institutions—and in some cases with support from philanthropic organizations—to reduce the barriers to engagement and encourage long-term, sustained political participation (Ramírez 2013). Some of these efforts may share similarities in appearance to partisan campaigns, yet the freedom from needing electoral "wins" distinguishes the motivation and goals of these efforts from tactical mobilization. Most significantly, proactive mobilization can contribute to the long-term vision of

Table 1. Overview of Mobilization Types

Type	Tactical	Reactive	Proactive
Definition	Partisan	Real or perceived imminent political threat	Civic infrastructure
Temporal Effects	Short-term	Mid-term	Long-term

expanding the Latino electorate by targeting "low-propensity"[1] Latino voters who are either newly registered or demonstrate irregular voting patterns, both of whom are unlikely to be targeted by partisan campaigns. Later in this chapter we explore examples of proactive mobilization by nonprofit organizations and Spanish-language media, such as the NALEO Educational Fund, Mi Familia Vota, and the ya es hora campaign.

As summarized in table 1, tactical efforts target short-term election-specific participation, reactive mobilization informs intermediary participation, and proactive mobilization influences long-term engagement. Before elaborating on the immediate and long-term consequences of proactive and reactive mobilization, we discuss contemporary instances of tactical mobilization.

Tactical Mobilization: Investing to Win

In the past two decades, presidential campaigns have demonstrated varying degrees of interest in the Latino electorate. The ebb and flow of interest in this community can partially be connected to the disparity between the size of the Latino population and unrealized turnout potential (Durand et al. 2006). However, outreach efforts by the campaigns of President George W. Bush in the 2000 and 2004 elections were lauded for the appeals made to deepen and strengthen relations he had established with Latinos since his time as Texas governor (Armas 2004). More specifically, Bush's campaigns appealed to Latinos on religious and moral grounds connected to issues such as abortion, stem-cell research, and marriage (Johnson 2004). From 2000 to 2004, the Protestant Latino vote for Bush rose from 44 percent to 56 percent (Fry, Passel, and Suro 2005). President Bush won in 2000 and again in 2004 with high support from Latino voters, estimated to be 35 percent and 43 percent respectively (Cillizza 2013).

In 2008, as part of Senator Hillary Clinton's bid for the presidency, Latinos were prioritized as a key voting bloc. At the time, it was believed that on February's "Super Tuesday," Latino voters could be key to unlocking states with large delegations in

the Democratic primaries.[2] As Sergio Bendixen, Clinton's head of Latino outreach, pointed out, "The Latino vote in California is the most important part of the firewall . . . if she can win California, no matter what happens the race is on" (Carlton 2008).

Spanish-language ads were developed and disseminated by both campaigns during the 2012 election cycle. The Obama campaign placed a focus on the shared experiences of the candidate as a son of an immigrant, while prominent Spanish-speaking politicians narrated commercials and radio ads as well. Another tactical approach was seen when Obama took on the historical chant "¡Si se puede!" ("Yes we can!") as part of a rally speech, which first began in a Los Angeles appearance and gained immediate popularity. While these approaches may have engaged some Latinos, other Latinos criticized Obama's use of a chant popularized by César Chávez and Dolores Huerta—civil rights leaders and cofounders of the United Farm Workers of America. Dolores Huerta stated that the Obama campaign attempted to establish a relationship with the community using shortcuts, unlike the Clinton campaign (Block 2008). Nonetheless, in the general election, Latinos were touted as a vital force in electing President Obama in Florida, New Mexico, Colorado, Indiana, and North Carolina (Barreto et al. 2010).

For example, in the "swing state" of Colorado, approximately 259,000 Latinos voted in the presidential election, accounting for 10.4 percent of all voters (U.S. Census Bureau 2013b). According to the impreMedia/Latino Decisions 2012 Latino Election Eve Poll, 59 percent of Latinos in Colorado were contacted compared to only 31 percent for the national average. However, in addition to an increased partisan campaign outreach, nonpartisan campaigns also sought out Latino voters. Weeks before the election, Grace Lopez Ramirez, Colorado State director for Mi Familia Vota, explained: "It is important for all of us as a community to engage in these issues, to educate our communities and to get out the vote" (Ryan 2012). Mi Familia Vota's mobilization and outreach efforts, like those of other nonpartisan and partisan local and national organizations, also contributed to higher than average contact rates and increased Latino turnout.[3]

PARTISAN ENGAGEMENT IN THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Both President Obama and Governor Romney attended the 2012 NALEO Annual Conference—one of only two organizational conferences both candidates attended on the campaign trail (the other was the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars). As a nonpartisan and nonprofit organization, the NALEO Educational Fund's conference provides a forum for policymakers from all levels of office and all parties to gather and discuss matters of importance to the Latino community. As such, the conference served as a unique opportunity for partisan campaigns to convey their

commitment to the Latino electorate and to Latino leadership in preparation for the general election. Shortly before the conference, Governor Romney launched "Juntos con Romney," while President Obama tapped into his 2008 campaign infrastructure of Obama for America to relaunch "Latinos for Obama." Notably, in the week leading up to the conference, President Obama also announced Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA),[4] which was considered a strategic decision for reengagement with the Latino electorate.

As Election Day neared, much of the Latino outreach from both campaigns focused on media buys. The Obama campaign invested more than $2 million on Spanish-language television and radio ads between April and June of 2012, and unions and super PACs committed $4 million for Spanish-language television and radio through the summer in Colorado, Nevada, and Florida (Bravender 2012). These buys were focused on historically competitive "swing" states. PBS NewsHour noted that "President Obama and Mitt Romney have spent eight times more money this year on Spanish-language ads than in 2008." Joseph (2012b), a reporter for *The Hill*, wrote:

> [The Romney campaign] debuted two new Spanish-language ads, one running in all swing states that attacks Obama on jobs and the national debt, with the other featuring Puerto Rico Gov. Luis Fortuño (R), targeted at the fast-growing Puerto Rican population in central Florida, stretching from Tampa to Orlando. Last month he also ran a Spanish-language ad with Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) addressing Social Security and Medicare (1).

Janelle Ross, from the *Huffington Post*, noted, "Beyond building the base the old-fashioned way, the Obama campaign [was] also running distinctive Spanish- and English-language TV ads targeting Latino voters" (2012). Ross further explained the diversity of the ads depending on the regional landscape—featuring Cubans, South Americans, and Puerto Ricans in areas like Florida versus Mexican American voters in the South and Southwest regions. Young (2012) identified tactics that set the Obama campaign apart from the Romney campaign, such as early registration and early voting, specifically in swing states, and directly targeting eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds, African Americans, Latinos, and single women. Young continues, "Voter turnout for these four key demographics was about 70% thereby giving him the numbers he needed to push him over the edge."

The Republican National Committee (RNC) launched a Latino outreach campaign targeting Latino voters nationwide and with an eye to local and state races in Colorado, Florida, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Virginia for local, state, and national races. With immigration at the forefront, RNC chairman Reince Priebus noted, "We all know it's the fastest growing demographic in America, and Latinos play a vital role in all of our communities" (Republican National Committee

2012b). Bettina Inclan was recruited by the Hispanic Outreach director to lead the campaign, which consisted of increased staff capacity in targeted states, social media promotion, and the "Unéte" mobile-text campaign (Republican National Committee 2012a). From Spanish interviews to blogs and YouTube videos, the campaign messaging highlighted the pitfalls of President Obama's term while focusing on the economy and employment as reasons to support Republican candidates (Harrison 2012; Republican National Committee 2012a).

The Obama campaign's mobilization efforts were lauded by many, but we argue that commentators erroneously conflated enhanced micro-targeting capacity (i.e., use of large quantities of data to identify and reach out to narrow segments of the electorate) with the intention to grow the Latino electorate. A question remains—how did the low voter turnout in 2010 and the projected low turnout of Latino voters in 2012 shift significantly to produce more than 11 million Latino voters? We do not suggest that the Obama campaign would claim credit for directly mobilizing all Latino voters nationally: to wit, during the Obama Campaign Legacy Conference, the Obama campaign released a report suggesting that their strategy was first and foremost geared at winning electoral votes—and doing so through innovative tactics in voter registration, persuasion, turnout, and organization-building in battleground states and border states.[5] Ten battleground states[6] "received a larger share of campaign resources, including organizers, offices, and principal and surrogate trips." According to the report, border states "built organizational strength and capacity to help President Obama win a nearby battleground state. For example, volunteers in California helped [the campaign] win Nevada and Colorado and volunteers in Alabama helped [the campaign] win Florida" (Obama Campaign 2013). At the national level, there was a National Latino Vote director and key personnel focused on communications and the translation of materials to Spanish. In addition, some battleground states[7] also had Latino Vote directors overseeing the operation to mobilize Latino voters locally. Nonetheless, the innovations in voter mobilization in the Obama campaign, while important, cannot account for all Latino turnout nationwide.

In order to determine the likely impact of the Obama campaign's tactical mobilization efforts on overall Latino turnout, it is important to analyze the share of the electorate in the battleground states where Latinos were deemed important.[8] Table 2 reflects the share of the Latino electorate in relation to the overall state electorate in the ten battleground states. Given the importance of electoral votes in these states, there was a strong emphasis placed on mobilization and voter turnout. Moreover, the margin of victory for states such as Colorado, Florida, and Nevada demonstrates the vital role Latino turnout played in securing electoral votes for the Obama campaign (Washington Post 2012).

Table 2. Latino Electorate Share in Battleground States (2012)

State	National share of Latino voters	Latino share of state registered voters	Latino share of total voters	Margin of victory
Colorado	2.31%	10.80%	10.40%	4.70%
Florida	12.50%	17.80%	17.30%	0.90%
Iowa	0.27%	1.80%	1.90%	5.60%
Nevada	1.40%	15.40%	15.00%	6.60%
New Hampshire	0.13%	2.00%	2.20%	5.70%
North Carolina	0.05%	2.20%	2.00%	2.20%
Ohio	0.88%	1.90%	1.80%	1.90%
Pennsylvania	1.64%	3.30%	3.20%	5.20%
Virginia	0.92%	2.70%	2.70%	3.00%
Wisconsin	0.63%	2.30%	2.70%	6.70%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2013a.

Given Florida's number of electoral votes, it is a key state for voter mobilization, especially of the Latino electorate. In 2012, nearly 1.4 million Latinos voted on Election Day, accounting for 17.3 percent of all voters (8.1 million) (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). As noted by Casey Klofstad in his chapter titled "Florida's Latino Electorate in the 2012 Election" in this volume, campaign outreach towards Latinos was higher in the state of Florida (37 percent) when compared to other states (31 percent).

According to the Current Population Survey's estimates of registration and voting in 2012, there were 11.2 million Latinos who voted on Election Day; of those, 20.73 percent resided in battleground states.[9] The turnout rate of Latino registered voters in battleground states was noticeably higher than the turnout of those in non-battleground states—87 percent and 80.4 percent respectively. Considering that nearly 80 percent of all Latino voters in the United States live in non-battleground states, tactical mobilization of Latinos in battleground states alone cannot explain the overall turnout of Latino voters nationwide.

It is nonetheless important to consider whether tactical mobilization sheds light on the higher turnout rates in battleground states—for instance, the effect of the Obama campaign's considerable investment in outreach to Latino voters through tailored content and messaging. Unlike Latino outreach in other states, given the larger share of non-immigrant Latinos in New Mexico, the Obama campaign strategically disseminated more English-language content than Spanish. As the Obama campaign confidently expected to win the state, they soon redistributed their resources in Colorado instead, thus exemplifying the essence of tactical mobilization (Obama

Table 3. 2012 Self-Reported Mobilization of Latino Registered Voters by Selected Characteristics

	State Characteristic		Nativity		Preferred Language	
	Non-Battleground	Battleground	Naturalized	Native-Born	Spanish*	English
Contacted	28.32%	43.13%	24.64%	36.61%	23.53%	36.49%
Not Contacted	71.68%	56.87%	75.36%	63.39%	76.46%	63.51%

Source: impreMedia/Latino Decisions Election Eve Poll. Analyses presented are weighted.

Note: Response to survey question: "Over the past few months, did anyone from a campaign, political party, or community organization ask you to vote, or register to vote?

*Totals under "Spanish" do not equate to 100 percent due to rounding.

Campaign 2013). Yet various policy debates in New Mexico arguably contributed to an increase in Latino voter turnout. For instance, the issue of granting state driver's licenses to undocumented immigrants was an important factor for 70 percent of Latino voters. The visibility of this issue, coupled with partisan outreach, mobilized Latino voters to make it count on Election Day.[10]

According to the impreMedia/Latino Decisions 2012 Latino Election Eve Poll results, 71 percent of Latino voters in Ohio felt President Barack Obama truly cared about Latinos, with only 13 percent believing the same about Governor Mitt Romney. This sentiment translated into an overwhelming 82 percent of Latinos in Ohio casting their votes for President Obama. However, the contention in Ohio went beyond presidential candidates, where the economy and job growth (issues ranking as high priority for Latino voters) took center stage in the Ohio U.S. Senate race. Republican state treasurer Josh Mandel and Democratic incumbent Sherrod Brown differed in their stances on economic development, and Senator Brown's position and ongoing political mobilization help him win reelection and secure another term in the Senate. As with all voters, Latino voters in Ohio were also tactically mobilized by connecting with them on key issues like the economy and jobs.[11]

Likewise, in the race for Nevada's 3rd Congressional District seat, incumbent congressman Joe Heck (R) and his Democratic opponent, John Oceguera, led campaigns with Latino voters in mind, investing nearly $200,000 combined on Spanish-language ads (Damon 2012). In an attempt to connect with Latino voters, John Oceguera launched a Spanish-language ad campaign featuring his family and education values, and highlighting the fact that he was raised by a single mother and that he worked his way through college. Additionally, Oceguera made several appearances at local events and met with key Latino leaders. On the other hand, as a means to appeal to Latino voters on a wide political spectrum, Congressman Joe Heck was a keynote speaker at the Hispanic Leadership Network business conference

Table 4. 2012 Partisan Mobilization Type by Selected Characteristics among Latino Registered Voters Contacted

	State Characteristic		Nativity		Preferred Language	
	Non-Battleground	Battleground	Naturalized	Native-Born	Spanish	English
Partisan	54.96%	60.08%	50.78%	58.84%	47.86%	60.32%
Non-Partisan	35.08%	29.38%	42.16%	29.26%	46.19%	27.54%
Both	9.96%	10.54%	7.05%	11.90%	5.95%	12.15%

Source: impreMedia/Latino Decisions Election Eve Poll. Analyses presented are weighted.

Note: Response to survey question: "Were you contacted by the Democrats, Republicans, both parties, or by representatives of community organizations?" (only asked of those who responded yes to having been contacted).

and also attended a Hispanics in Politics event to discuss his platform (Hispanic Leadership Network 2012). Despite his opposition to the DREAM Act, right-of-birth U.S. citizenship, and immigration reform, Congressman Joe Heck won the election by nearly 8 percentage points (Nevada Secretary of State 2012).

Some of this difference in turnout can be attributed to increased rates of tactical mobilization in battleground states. Table 3 illustrates that the rate of self-reported contact for Latino registered voters living in battleground states was about 15 percent higher than for those Latinos registered as living elsewhere (43 percent vs. 28 percent). The tactical mobilization, however, was not solely based on geography but also on key demographic characteristics. Naturalized Latinos and those who opted to respond to the 2012 Latino Election Eve Poll in Spanish were less likely to report being contacted to register or to vote (12 percent and 13 percent respectively). The difference in reported contact highlights that Latino turnout nationally was not solely driven by presidential campaigns' tactical mobilization. In both battleground and non-battleground states, there are partisan campaigns for legislative districts and statewide offices that may have reached out to Latino voters. Even in the battleground states, the mobilization of Latino registered voters should not be interpreted as only representing the efforts of partisan campaigns, because nonpartisan Latino organizations were also active.

To further explore these emerging patterns, table 4 demonstrates additional characteristics of the type of Latino voters contacted by state and campaign type.

The focus and type of campaign outreach aimed at Latinos in 2012 varied considerably. Partisan campaigns constituted the largest share of reported contact among Latino registered voters—65 percent of Latino voters in non-battleground states and 71 percent in battleground states report being contacted by partisan campaigns. There were also marked differences among demographic subgroups. For example, English-dominant Latino voters were more likely to receive encouragement

to register or vote from partisan sources, and 60 percent of native-born Latinos reported contact from partisan campaigns.

The relevance of nonpartisan groups in mobilizing the oft-ignored segments of the Latino electorate (i.e., naturalized, Spanish speakers, and those in non-battleground states) is evident in the rates of reported contact. While a large share of all registered Latino voters in both battleground and non-battleground states reported contact from nonpartisan sources (45 percent and 41 percent respectively), nonpartisan outreach efforts appear to have placed greater emphasis on engaging immigrant and Spanish-dominant Latinos than partisan outreach efforts. For example, 42 percent of naturalized Latino voters contacted by a campaign indicated that they were contacted only by nonpartisan organizations, versus 29 percent of native-born Latino voters. Similarly, among Spanish speakers, they were about equally as likely to be contacted by partisan as nonpartisan campaigns. These characteristics in voting demographics and preferences are important to keep in mind as campaigns develop micro-targeted methods of outreach. As we discuss in the next section, this illustrates the proactive mobilization strategy of Latino nonpartisan civic institutions with an eye to long-term electoral presence of Latino voters.

The language-specific effects of tactical mobilization are not only evident with respect to GOTV efforts, but also by the amount of resources spent on reaching out to the Spanish-speaking community by partisan campaigns.[12] While the amount spent in 2012 on Spanish-language media was more than in 2008, this is not commensurate with the size of the Latino electorate. Based on comprehensive data on local television advertising from Kantar Media's CMAG, an October 2012 report by the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (USHCC) found that between April 10th and September 25th of 2012, Spanish-language advertising constituted less than 5 percent of the $358,898,420 total spending on political advertising. With a reported 38.3 million (13 percent) U.S. Spanish-speaking population (U.S. Census Bureau 2014a) and 23.5 million eligible Latino voters (U.S. Census Bureau 2013b), there is a stark difference in investment. Javier Palomarez, president and CEO of the USHCC, reacted to the notable disparity, pointing out that "While political advertising spending records are being shattered, neither political party is investing a comparable percentage of their advertising dollars to reach these voters. The difference between rhetoric and action is striking and, frankly, troubling" (Hartfield 2012). Striking as it may be for Latino elites, this is consistent with expectations of tactical mobilization of expending only enough resources to get to 270 Electoral College votes.

Reactive Mobilization: Unexpected Mobilization, Unexpected Turnout?

Two major policy issues, immigration and voting rights, shaped the political landscape in the run-up to the 2012 general election, particularly in regard to the Latino community. As it has in the past, immigration became a contentious issue with strong resonance among Latino voters, while new election-administration policy changes emerged as a potential threat to the participation of this historically marginalized segment of the electorate. Although discussed in different public dialogues and to different degrees (immigration being a much wider part of public discourse), both issues shaped the mobilization of Latino voters.

THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE

The 2012 election was not the first to see immigration being used as a wedge issue, nor the first in which it served as a catalyst for mobilization. The civic unrest of the 1990s occurred within a weaker civic infrastructure, while more recent protests showcased the impact of increased coordination and strengthening civic infrastructure, allowing for proactive mobilization to respond more effectively to perceived political threats. Such was the case early in 2012, when Governor Romney's statements regarding "self-deportation" during a Republican primary debate drew outrage nationally from immigration and Latino advocates alike. After securing his party's nomination, however, Romney's views and stances on immigration evolved, resulting in a softening of his position in an effort to appeal to and court Latino voters (Joseph 2012b).

The Obama campaign also faced challenges in regard to its position on immigration. Besides the Obama administration failing to fulfill the promise of comprehensive immigration reform during the president's first term, there have been record deportation numbers reaching almost 2 million removals from 2008 to 2012 (Department of Homeland Security 2012). According to the Pew Hispanic Center, polls (comprising primarily Latinos) report high disapproval ratings of 59 percent for the Obama administration in respect to deportations (Lopez, Gonzalez-Barrera, and Motel 2011a). However, with the announcement of "Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), presidential approval ratings reached 75 percent among Latino voters by the end of 2012 (Pew Hispanic Research Center 2013).

Even though the intent and timing of this announcement was hotly debated among partisan strategists and columnists, the impact of this decision on mobilization cannot be understated. With an overwhelming majority of adult Latinos (89 percent) and Latino registered voters (86 percent) approving of the Obama

administration's DACA policy (see Lopez, Gonzalez-Barrera, and Motel 2011b), this new policy had an instrumental impact on the political landscape and the mobilization efforts that followed. For example, a poll by America's Voice found that DACA was a mobilizing factor for many Latinos, with 38 percent of Latinos naming the policy as "the single most important issue" or a "very important issue" in determining their vote. The impreMedia/Latino Decisions 2012 Latino Election Eve Poll further confirmed the mobilizing factor of DACA and the candidates' stances on immigration, with the poll reporting that 58 percent of Latinos were more enthusiastic about voting for President Obama following the announcement of DACA, while 57 percent were less enthusiastic about Governor Romney and his stance on immigration.

While DACA may have been a strategic political move for President Obama, ongoing immigration-reform advocacy efforts continued to elevate the importance of immigration among Latino communities throughout 2012. Local and statewide groups mobilized the Latino community in Arizona around immigration. United We Dream, for instance (founded in Phoenix in 2008), expanded nationwide with fifty-two affiliates and stands as an example of how nonpartisan organizations can educate and mobilize voters in response to an imminent threat or to prevent one. In 2012, United We Dream launched the "Right to Dream Campaign," seeking to raise awareness of immigration policy debates and identify elected officials as opponents and supporters of immigration (United We Dream 2012). As a result, organizers were able to connect directly with community members with resources and recruit them to participate in other issue-based campaigns. Also in Phoenix, Somos America (We are America) organized community events to address questions about immigration and encourage eligible voters to stand against anti-immigration laws by voting (Cornish 2012). Daniel Rodriguez, a "Dreamer" and president of Somos America, spoke to participants at the event: "Raise your hand . . . if you know someone who's not here but needs this information. Raise your hand if you know someone who's been deported. Raise your hand if you know someone who has the power to vote." Rodriguez and others persuasively connected with the networks and experiences of undocumented voters while also prompting eligible voters to take action. This proved essential in mobilizing Latino voters to vote.

VOTING RIGHTS AND THE STATE HOUSE

Despite numerous levels of federal, state, and local legal protection, voters faced an unprecedented number of challenges to casting their ballots and making their voices heard in the 2012 general election. With cuts to early voting, limitations to same-day and third-party voter registration, and new identification requirements

(among many other policies), the 2012 election was particularly challenging for Latino participation. At the polls, a lack of personnel and ill-preparedness were also factors in increased waiting and long lines across the country (up to eight hours in Florida), while some organizations allegedly misinformed volunteers and poll workers (Charles 2012).

In October 2012, the NALEO Educational Fund released an assessment of restrictive voting and registration measures across the country, uncovering the systemic harm that such legislation would impose on Latino voters and other underrepresented segments of the potential electorate (NALEO Educational Fund 2012). These measures were shown to disproportionately have a negative impact on access to voting among certain segments of the population (e.g., Latinos, blacks, immigrants, youth, etc.).

For instance, a new regulation in Pennsylvania (enacted in March 2013) required all voters to present photo identification in order to cast a ballot, generating voter anxiety and confusion and a perceived threat to the electoral process. Rather than expending their energies on fighting the legislation in the courts, many community-based organizations focused on mobilizing and preparing the Latino electorate of Pennsylvania to vote with identification. For example, the Pennsylvania Voter ID Coalition (an advocacy group of organizations from numerous sectors) coordinated efforts to ensure that every voter in Pennsylvania attained the identification required to cast a ballot (Loeb 2012). Ultimately, just weeks prior to the election, a federal judge ruled that the requirement would be placed on hold until after the 2012 election cycle due to the limited turnaround time for implementation, a ruling applauded by the Coalition and others fighting restrictions to the voting process (Gregg 2012). However, this translated into organizations mobilizing in order to provide additional voter education, legal advocacy, and outreach to ensure that voters, poll workers, and other community members knew that there would be no identification requirements on Election Day after all (Johnson and Terkel 2012).

Many community-based organizations focused on traditional "in-field" voter registration, and some of these mobilization efforts faced challenges as a result of new legislation and electoral regulations ahead of the 2012 general election. In Florida, restrictions on third-party registration activities "contributed to the decision of organizations including the National Council of La Raza's Democracia program and the League of Women Voters to temporarily suspend their work in the state while litigation over the law ensued" (United States District Court 2011; NALEO 2012). These regulations included the requirement that all canvassers register with county registrar offices and submit all voter-registration applications within forty-eight hours, lest the individual assisting in the registration (rather than the organization behind the effort) be assessed fines (NALEO 2012).

For underrepresented voters, the impact of these regulations was projected to be devastating; according to the Brennan Center for Justice, "African-American and Latino citizens register through drives [registration] at twice the rate as whites" (Kasdan and Weiser 2012). Professor Daniel Smith, from the University of Florida, conducted a post-election analysis demonstrating that in comparison to voter registration in the 2008 presidential election cycle (prior to the new regulations taking effect) there was a decrease in approximately 80,000 registrations (Allen 2012). Nonetheless, the League of Women Voters and National Council of La Raza ultimately fought against the new regulations in the courts, and adapted in-field registration efforts to the new regulations.

Florida governor Rick Scott initiated a purge of alleged noncitizens from the state's voter rolls ahead of the 2012 general election ("Florida Voter Purge" 2012). Many nonpartisan civic institutions joined together and challenged these efforts on grounds that the voter-list purge "mostly [targeted] the wrong people" and "some voters who [became] citizens a few years before [were] now receiving letters saying they [had] to prove their citizenship" (Lilley 2012). NALEO Educational Fund partners like the Florida Latino Immigrant Coalition helped ensure that eligible voters were not removed from the voter rolls by coordinating with media to make certain that voters were fully educated about the process and their rights as voters and what steps to take should they be incorrectly purged from the voter rolls. Despite the potential to disenfranchise Latino voters, those efforts ultimately generated modest reactive mobilization and galvanized organizational and voter efforts.[13]

Proactive Mobilization: Nonpartisan Campaigns and Latino Mobilization

The nonprofit sector has not always played such an active role in Latino voter engagement. In 2000, the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute's (TRPI) evaluation of Latino voter mobilization efforts found minimal to nonexistent infrastructure of nonprofit services and programs promoting political participation. The study pointed to the most common mobilization strategy as voter registration (de la Garza et al. 2002). TRPI noted that

> Overall, there is little to be said about Latino GOTV efforts. In California, which we consider to have the most effectively organized Latino communities in the nation, those few Latino mobilization campaigns identified were episodic, under-funded and dependent on volunteers (7).

Thirteen years later, nonpartisan civic institutions play a distinct and vital role in the mobilization of the Latino electorate. Partisan campaigns inherently operate with the goal of "winning" electoral outcomes—typically defined as their candidate winning 50 percent or more of all votes cast in a race. Resources are therefore strategically allocated to ensure high turnout of supporters, persuade "undecided" but regular voters, and focus on geographies that are most critical in the campaign's political calculus. Nonpartisan campaigns, however, cannot have electoral goals. Laws governing 501(c)(3) organizations mandate that any political-engagement work be educational in nature and strictly nonpartisan. With the exception of some activity around ballot measures, this allows nonprofit programming to focus on outreach that would likely be overlooked by partisan campaigns and activities that are essential for building long-term participation and a vibrant democracy—from unbiased voter education to engagement of infrequent voters.

The engagement of infrequent or low-propensity voters has proven to be a successful tactic for integrating Latinos into the civic process. Until recently, partisan and nonpartisan campaigns alike were inclined to focus engagement efforts on "most-likely" or "higher propensity" voters, consequently disregarding other voters (Ramírez 2005). In 2002, the NALEO Educational Fund carried out a GOTV campaign, Voces del Pueblo, designed to specifically target low-propensity voters with the goal of converting nonvoters to voters, and most importantly, reach segments of the population overlooked by traditional campaigns' methods. Results demonstrated that with a combination of live calls, "robo" calls, and mailers, Latino voter participation increased. More specifically, the live calls played the greatest role in determining voting behavior, with every twenty-two live calls translating into one voter (Ramírez 2005). With campaign experiments dating back to 2000, NALEO Educational Fund has continued to design programs and outreach activities utilizing empirically tested and proven strategies for engaging Latino voters, including a special focus on low-propensity and "unengaged" voters. Moreover, with the growing literature pointing to the intricacies and nuances of the Latino electorate and the importance of nonpartisan mobilization efforts, other nonpartisan campaigns have also adjusted their outreach strategies.

According to national polling from November 2012, partisan campaigns contacted the largest share of Latino registered voters in all states. With the depth of resources raised and expended in federal campaigns, this is to be expected. Estimates suggest nearly $2 billion spent (Ashkenas et al. 2013). Yet, the long-term vision of community-based organizations is evident when comparing non-battleground states to battleground states. As noted in table 4, in non-battleground states, a greater share of registered Latino voters report that the outreach they received was

nonpartisan in nature. This reflects the relatively high investment of nonpartisan efforts in engaging those voters and geographies overlooked by partisan campaigns, with the intent to build a more participatory Latino electorate for the long term.

Of particular note are the mobilizing factors of key propositions throughout California. Education and public safety, issues ranking in importance among Latino voters, were central for several ballot measures in 2012. Specifically, Proposition 30, or the "Temporary Taxes to Fund Education, Guaranteed Local Public Safety Funding Initiative," drew overwhelming support from Latino voters. This speaks to the saliency of key issues and the value of coupling proactive mobilization with localized messaging.[14]

Overall, across all states where polls were conducted, 33 percent of voters were contacted by a community organization. Table 5 further reflects the role of community organizations in voter mobilization in relation to partisan candidate campaigns. The highest contact rates were found in California, New Mexico, Colorado, Texas, Massachusetts, and Arizona, demonstrating how the national Latino turnout in battleground states was not solely driven by presidential campaigns' tactical mobilization.

BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS TO MOBILIZE LATINOS

In a concerted effort to maximize reach and minimize redundancy in the nonpartisan outreach to Latino voters, the nation's leading Latino nonprofit advocacy and civil rights organizations joined together in 2011 to form the National Latino Civic Engagement Table (NLCET).[15] The historic collaboration of the NLCET led to the registration of more than a quarter of a million Latino voters and calls to nearly 3.5 million registered Latino voters in key states such as Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia (table 6). Moreover, the NLCET provided a forum for dissemination of voter-education and voter-rights information, sharing of best practices, strategic planning, and other essential elements for large-scale outreach and engagement.

Specifically, the focus of NLCET efforts on ten states with significant, influential, and growing Latino populations contributed to an increase in Latino mobilization and Latino turnout. In Arizona, in-person canvassers walked various communities to promote voter registration and voting (Drummond and Sinclair 2013). Further east, campaigns in Texas and Florida included large-scale voter registration, while outreach efforts in North Carolina and Virginia sought to engage relatively new and emerging Latino communities. For example, Latino population growth in North Carolina is translating into stronger political clout, with registered Latino voters increasing from 10,000 in 2004 to more than 113,000 in 2012. Overall, the NLCET

Table 5. Latino Voters Contacted by Type of 2012 Campaign

	Democrats	Republicans	Community organization
National	59%	39%	33%
Arizona	54%	33%	30%
California	55%	31%	46%
Colorado	75%	40%	33%
Florida	53%	51%	29%
Massachusetts	61%	37%	32%
North Carolina	58%	34%	29%
New Mexico	66%	44%	22%
Nevada	67%	44%	22%
Ohio	74%	54%	27%
Texas	54%	43%	32%
Virginia	76%	67%	23%

Source: impreMedia/Latino Decisions 2012 Latino Election Eve Poll.
Note: Response to survey question: "Were you contacted by Democrats, Republicans, both parties, or by a representative of an organization?"

Table 6. NLCET Phone Canvassing Efforts

State	Voters canvassed	State	Voters canvassed
Arizona	242,523	New Mexico	350,035
California	359,238	North Carolina	7,573
Colorado	761,272	Texas	522,937
Florida	459,685	Virginia	242,605
Maryland	97,256	*Total*	*3,461,554*
Nevada	418,430		

proved to be an effective method of developing and implementing a shared national drive in coordination with local, state, and regional programming.

"National Voter Registration Day" (NVRD), which was described as "a national day of action and push people to register to vote before it's too late for the November election," also offered an opportunity for civic institutions to collaborate (Froomkin 2012). One of NVRD's objectives was to challenge common confusion and dispel misinformation about the voter-registration process. Head Count, a nonpartisan voter-registration group, found that 52 percent of eligible first-time youth voters from the 2008 election did not know whether they were still registered to vote at their current address for the 2012 election (A. Bernstein 2012). Hundreds of grassroots

organizations and volunteers collaborated to organize voter-registration drives across the nation, using both online technology and traditional methods. The outcome was that hundreds of thousands registered to vote as a result of the coordinated NVRD efforts in 2012, and the momentum continued into 2013.[16]

In addition to national partnerships, local coalitions have also garnered the resources and capacity to serve the Latino community, with the short-term goal of voter registration and education leading to a long-term change of the political landscape and electorate. For instance, in North Carolina, El Pueblo (another NALEO Educational Fund partner) collaborated with local groups at a credit union to conduct in-field voter registration and voter-rights education for the Latino community. El Pueblo also designed a voter-registration campaign targeting multigenerational families, encouraging different generations to provide education to one another and assistance with registering and voting. As outlined by Betina Wilkinson in the chapter titled "North Carolina Latinos: An Emerging, Influential Electorate in the South" in this volume, the greatest potential in the Latino electorate of North Carolina may reside with young voters, who represent the largest and youngest electorate among all ethnic groups in the state. This presents an opportunity to build continuous and long-term Latino voter participation.

Similarly, increased Latino growth in Virginia is fueling coalition-building at the local and state level. In 2012, Latinos made up 8 percent of the state population, but by 2020 they are expected to be well over 11 percent. The Virginia Coalition of Latino Organizations (VACOLAO) has coordinated mobilization and advocacy efforts with faith-based and civil-rights groups, in addition to legal and civic organizations in the area, to raise awareness around voter-protection and voting-regulation issues with legislators, election administrators, and the Latino community. In addition to voter outreach, VACOLAO conducts workshops and advocacy on immigration, which is a fundamental mobilization issue for the Latino community in Virginia. As D. Xavier Medina Vidal points out in the chapter titled "The New *Virginiano* Electorate and the Politics of Immigration in Virginia" in this volume, immigration was a unifying force in bringing together Latinos from diverse economic, educational, and ethnic backgrounds in the state and motivating them to become citizens and registered voters. Based on the role Virginia plays in presidential elections, the growing Virginia Latino community positions the state as a ground for demonstrating the importance of Latino mobilization and turnout.

ROLE OF SPANISH-LANGUAGE MEDIA IN MOBILIZATION

Unlike most of their English-language media counterparts, Spanish-language media has historically been very involved in informing their viewers and involving them

in civic engagement opportunities (Ramírez 2013). Building on collaboration across several election cycles, NALEO Educational Fund along with hundreds of local partners and national coordinating partners (including Entravision Communications, impreMedia, Mi Familia Vota Education Fund, National Council of La Raza, and Univision Communications) relaunched the historic ya es hora campaign in 2012. After the election, Lizette Alvarez of the *New York Times* noted the impact of the ya es hora campaign and the unique multilayered approach it took to connect with Latino voters, gain their trust, provide them with information, and mobilize them to participate:

> In countless households, Latinos tuned their television sets to Univision and heard Jorge Ramos, the host of "*Al Punto*," the Spanish version of "Meet the Press," discuss the candidates' positions on issues critical to them. They switched on Spanish-language radio and heard myriad reasons their vote could spur change. . . . And if voters in some battleground areas needed a ride to the polls, television and radio stations owned by Entravision Communications, Univision's largest affiliate, offered those, too. (Alvarez 2012).

The synergistic partnership between Spanish-language media and Latino nonpartisan efforts such as the ya es hora campaign helped expand the potential electorate. The *New York Times* noted that with ya es hora campaign, "how Latinos got [the] message—the relentless call to register, to vote, to participate—was as important as the message itself: Hispanic television and grass-roots groups working together generated a civic campaign they called ya es hora—Now Is the Time" (Alvarez 2012).

Mobilization in 2014 and Beyond

Latino mobilization efforts reached new heights during the 2012 election cycle, with a unique combination of tactical, reactive, and proactive mobilization contributing to the community's historic impact. Partisan campaigns actively targeted and reached out to Latino voters at unprecedented levels as part of the tactical mobilization of the Latino electorate. Perceived political threats and the short-term and long-term effects of restrictive voting measures, coupled with the debate on immigration, primed the political landscape for increased participation and led to heightened awareness and reactive mobilization.

Tactical forms of mobilization in 2014 and beyond will need to incorporate concerted efforts to connect with Latino voters. Partisan campaigns specifically may need to modify outreach in regions with large Latino populations and also

augment infrastructural investment in areas with emerging Latino communities. With considerable regional differences, utilizing the same surface-level tactics across all geographies may no longer be a viable method to genuinely connect with Latino voters. In order for tactical mobilization to remain relevant and effective, partisan campaigns will have to shift from a homogeneous method of outreach to a multipronged approach that better suits the tremendous diversity within the Latino electorate.

Coordination among nonpartisan civic institutions to conduct voter registration, GOTV, and other programs to proactively mobilize the Latino electorate ensured Latino voter engagement in states without competitive presidential contests in the 2012 election cycle. Most importantly, these efforts contributed to an infrastructure vital to the long-term political mobilization of the Latino community. These successes were not devoid of challenges, with new administrative changes proving to be taxing for Latino voters and organizations. For example, operators on the NALEO Educational Fund's 888-VE-Y-VOTA hotline assisted hundreds of potential voters who lacked information and resources (39 percent), were denied provisional ballots (16 percent), needed language-specific materials and assistance (13 percent), or unfairly faced impositions to prove their identity or registration status (4 percent) during the election cycle. Nonetheless, these examples serve as opportunities to continue to build and promote effective engagement of the Latino electorate.

A potential game-changer in regards to Latino voter mobilization could come in the form of changes to the Voting Rights Act (VRA). On June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States released their decision in the case of *Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder*, which ruled as unconstitutional the formula (Section IV of the VRA) used to determine which jurisdictions are required to receive preclearance from the United States Department of Justice prior to implementing any change to their election policies (Section V of the VRA), due to a history of deliberate voter disenfranchisement. The State of Texas (a Section V jurisdiction) has already implemented its new voter-identification requirement, which was deemed discriminatory (particularly against Latinos) by the Department of Justice during a preclearance review in August 2012. In order to prevent discriminatory practices and threats to voting rights through election-administration changes, advocacy groups are working with Congress to develop and pass legislation with a new coverage formula.[17] Before and after a new formula is implemented, we will likely see an increase in both reactive and proactive mobilization in the Latino community, both in response to the debate and as additional voter education around election policy changes is needed.

The uncertainty surrounding comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) will also bring additional opportunities for multiple forms of mobilization. Despite setbacks in Congress, national nonpartisan civic institutions continue to build cross-sectional and multi-jurisdictional advocacy efforts to champion reform in 2014 and beyond. The struggle for CIR will likely be central to strategic voter-mobilization efforts by nonpartisan organizations in 2014—both as a catalyst for action (in essence, leveraging reactive mobilization), and to build bridges between the advocacy and voter-engagement worlds. Organizations will also have the capacity to tap into the networks built over years of proactive mobilization to enhance and encourage reactive mobilization. Moreover, parties and candidates will also likely utilize CIR as a tool for tactical mobilization of those for and against CIR, in addition to using it as a wedge issue for reactive mobilization. However, the extent to which the dialogue and political struggles around CIR and the reforming of the VRA will contribute to the growth and engagement of the Latino community remains to be seen.

The U.S. Census Bureau projects that the Latino population will more than double from an estimated 53.3 million in 2012 to a projected 128.8 million in 2060 (R. Bernstein 2012). With an increasingly large majority of Latinos being born in the United States and therefore citizens eligible to vote upon turning eighteen, it is vital that mobilization efforts increasingly prioritize Latino voters. This is particularly relevant for partisan campaigns, whose deep resources and prominence can reach millions, and whose future is dependent upon successful and long-term engagement of Latino voters. It is also critical that nonpartisan efforts are sufficiently resourced to continue their essential role in building the electorate over the long term. Combined with the strategic leveraging of reactive mobilization, these strategies are vital to ensuring that the Latino community fully participates in the political process.

NOTES

1. A discussion of low-propensity voters is provided later in this chapter.
2. "Super Tuesday" took place on February 5, 2008, when twenty-three states held the Democratic Party primary.
3. For a detailed discussion on Colorado, see the chapter by Robert Preuhs titled "The 2012 Latino Vote in Colorado," in this volume.
4. DACA, announced on June 15, 2012, would allow for certain people who came to the United States as children to apply for deferred "action" (deportation) for a period of two years, subject to renewal, and would then be eligible for work authorization.
5. The report defined "border states" as those expected to be decided by a wide margin, such as California, and that were geographically located close to a battleground state.
6. The ten battleground states included Wisconsin, Nevada, Iowa, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Colorado, Virginia, Ohio, Florida, and North Carolina.
7. These included Colorado, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Virginia, and Wisconsin. In Florida, there were two Latino Vote directors.
8. The sample-size population for the registration and turnout information in New Hampshire, Ohio, and Iowa is relatively small and may have a higher margin of error;

however, they are included in a table given their political significance as battleground states.

9. 2.7 million of the 13.7 million Latino registered voters live in the selected ten states.
10. For more information on New Mexico, see the chapter titled "The 2012 Latino Vote in New Mexico: Immigration Emerges in Unexpected Ways," in this volume.
11. For more information on Ohio, see the chapter titled "Brown Ballots in the Buckeye State," in this volume.
12. The Obama campaign invested more than $2 million on Spanish-language television and radio ads between April and June of 2012, while union supporters and super PACs committed $4 million on Spanish-language television and radio through the summer in Colorado, Nevada, and Florida.
13. Nearly two years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit ruled in April 2014 that Florida's voter purge violated federal law. In a 2–1 decision, the Court concluded that the voter purge violated the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), due to systemic removal programs being unconstitutional within 90 days of a federal election (Alvarez 2014).
14. NALEO Educational Fund carried these best practices into proactive mobilization efforts in local races in 2013, confirming the importance of increased investments across all levels of campaigning.
15. Partners include Center for Community Change (CCC), the Hispanic Federation, the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA), the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), Mi Familia Vota Education Fund, NALEO Educational Fund, National Council of La Raza, Presente, and Voto Latino.
16. National Voter Registration Day 2012, http://nationalvoterregistrationday.org.
17. The Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014 was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives (and a companion bill in the U.S. Senate) on January 16, 2014. As of writing, neither bill has yet to be heard in committee.

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